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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the extent to which Dutch organizations use ‘new’ performance 
measures to deal with the perceived inadequacies of traditional accounting performance 
measures. In addition, the determinants of the use of these ‘new’ performance measures 
are documented; finally, the alignment hypothesis is tested. Using survey data from 
Dutch firms, I find that non-financial measures appear to be used most often in addition 
to more traditional performance measures; economic value measures and subjective 
measures appear to be used to a lesser extent. Second, the results indicate that the 
importance of the shareholder value goal and size are positively related to the use of 
economic value measures. The importance of the shareholder value goal, a growth 
mission, task culture and size are all positively associated with the use of non-financial 
measures. The (relative) use of subjective measures is negatively related to size. Finally, I 
find no support for the alignment hypothesis that a mismatch between the firm’s strategic 
and contextual characteristics and its performance measurement system adversely affect 
performance. 
 
Keywords: contingency theory; economic value measures; non-financial performance 
measures; subjective performance measures; survey. 
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1 Introduction 
Previous literature suggests that performance measurement systems should be tied to the 
goals and strategies of the organization (Malina & Selto, 2004, 2001; Chenhall, 2003; 
Said et al, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Hoque & James, 2000; Otley, 1999; Ittner et al, 
1997; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1982; Gordon & Miller, 1976), as 
well as matched to other contingency factors (such as environment, culture and size; see 
Chenhall, 2003; Chapman, 1997; Otley, 1980; and Gordon & Miller, 1976). In addition, 
performance measures should be effective (i.e., accurate, objective and measurable) and 
reflect managerial effort (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Malina & Selto, 2001; 
Simons, 2000). In this research project, the focus is on the first issue; i.e., I investigate the 
relation between strategic and contextual characteristics of the organization and the use 
and effectiveness of the specific performance measures. 
 
In the past decade, several ‘new’ performance measures1 (such as economic value 
measures, non-financial measures and subjective measures) have been introduced to deal 
with the perceived inadequacies in traditional accounting-based performance measures 
(such as earnings or return on investment; see Hoque & James, 2000; Ittner & Larcker, 
2001, 1998). While several studies have investigated the use of contemporary accounting 
practices in organizations (see, for example, Ferreira & Otley, 2004; Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith, 1998b), there is relatively little empirical evidence available on the 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘new’ financial performance measure should be considered relatively; some ‘new’ performance 
measures are based on concepts that have been around for several decades (see, for example, Kaplan & 
Norton, 2001; Otley, 1999).  
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relation between strategic and contextual characteristics, the use of ‘new’ performance 
measures and performance (Ittner et al, 2003b; Ittner & Larcker, 2001, 1998; Langfield-
Smith, 1997; Chapman, 1997). This study extends previous research on the ‘diffusion 
rate’ of contemporary performance measures by documenting the state of affairs in Dutch 
organizations. Second, and more important, this study provides evidence on the 
determinants of the use of specific contemporary performance measures. Finally, I 
investigate the ‘alignment hypothesis’; i.e., do organizations that match their performance 
measurement systems to the strategic and contextual characteristics of their organization 
perform better than ‘non-aligned firms’? Rather than solely relying on self-reported 
satisfaction or firm performance, I use both perceptual as well as accounting performance 
measures to investigate the effects of the use of the ‘new’ performance measures. These 
last two issues (determinants of the use of ‘new’ performance measures and impact on 
financial performance) have received surprisingly little attention in the research literature 
(see Chenhall, 2003; Ittner et al, 2003b).  
 
Using data from a survey amongst Dutch firms, I find that non-financial measures (such 
as customer satisfaction, employee measures and quality measures) appear to be used 
most often to deal with the allegedly negative effects of traditional accounting 
performance measures. Economic value measures (eg. Economic Value Added, 
Shareholder Value Analysis) and subjective measures (competence management, 
managerial intuition) are used to a much lesser extent. Economic value measures are used 
by large organizations that find shareholder value important. As such, the use of 
economic value measures appears to be used to align managerial decisions to shareholder 
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interests. Non-financial performance measures are used mainly in large firms that focus 
on shareholder value and growth (i.e., have build missions) and have task cultures. 
Finally, I find that an increase in size is negatively associated with the relative use of 
subjective performance measures (probably to reduce influence costs). Finally, a closer 
match between strategic and other contextual factors and the performance measurement 
system of a company is not related to increased performance. In other words, I find no 
support for the alignment hypothesis that a mismatch between the firm’s strategic and 
contextual characteristics and its performance measurement system adversely affect 
performance. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
relevant literature in this area and presents the subsequent hypotheses. The third section 
describes the methodology and the data which are used in this study. The following 
section provides the empirical results. Finally, the summary and conclusions of this 
research project are presented.  
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Performance measurement 
A performance measurement system can be defined as the formal, information-based 
routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational 
activities (Simons, 2000). One of the characteristics of an effective performance 
measurement system, which is capable of promoting desired organizational outcomes, is 
that it should be tied to the organizational goals and strategies (Ittner & Larcker, 2001; 
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Otley, 1999) as well as to other organizational characteristics (Chenhall, 2003). A 
performance measurement system should provide a comprehensive yet parsimonious set 
of measures, linked with the goals and strategies of the organization; in addition, the 
performance measures should be effective (i.e., accurate, objective and verifiable; Malina 
& Selto, 2001). A second characteristic of an effective performance measurement system 
is that the performance measures should reflect managerial effort, should have 
appropriate (challenging, yet attainable) targets and should be related to meaningful 
rewards (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Malina & Selto, 2004, 2001; Simons, 2000). 
In this paper, the focus is on the first issue (i.e., the relation between the strategic and 
contextual characteristics of the firm and the use and effectiveness of specific 
performance measures).  
 
Firms have traditionally relied almost exclusively on financial measures such as budgets, 
profits or accounting returns to measure performance (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; 
Said et al, 2003; AICPA, 2001; Otley, 1999; Ittner et al, 1997; Bushman et al, 1996). In 
the last decade, these ‘traditional’ accounting performance measures have been 
increasingly perceived as not meeting the requirements of an effective performance 
measurement system (Ittner & Larcker, 2001, 1998; Hoque & James, 2000). These 
perceived inadequacies have motivated several academics and practitioners to suggest a 
variety of performance measurement innovations, ranging from ‘improved’ financial 
metrics such as economic value measures (Stern et al, 1995), to (balanced) scorecards 
that integrate financial and non-financial measures (Kaplan & Norton, 2001, 1992) and 
personal or subjective measures (Gibbs et al, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003a). The main 
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characteristics of both the ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ performance measures will be 
discussed shortly in the following sections.  
 
Accounting performance measures 
Accounting-based performance measures have many characteristics that help explain 
their prominent role in performance evaluation and compensation (Indjejikian, 1999): 
they are subject to a variety of internal controls that enhance their reliability and they are 
easy to understand. In addition, they integrate the results of all organizational activities 
into a single coherent measure (Otley, 1999). A drawback of accounting-based measures 
is that they provide gaming opportunities (such as earnings management activities)2. In 
addition, they are considered backward-looking and short-term focused (i.e., they are 
‘lagging variables’); that is, they do not provide any information on the creation of value 
(Stewart, 2002) or the realization of strategic goals (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). Common 
accounting performance measures include budgeted versus actual results and return on 
investment measures (see AICPA, 2001; Hoque & James, 2000; Otley, 1999). 
 
Economic value measures 
One line of performance measurement innovations has focused on improving the 
financial measures (‘new financial measures’ or ‘economic value measures’). Proponents 
of economic value measures argue that performance measurement systems should be 
aligned with the firm’s ultimate organizational objective: improved economic 
performance (Ittner et al, 2003b). The foundations for these ‘economic value measures’ 
                                                 
2
 It should be noticed that not only financial measures can be manipulated; see, for example, Smith (2002) 
for an exploration of this issue. 
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are residual income, internal rate of return and cash-flow concepts. For example, the 
EVA©3-measure developed by Stern Stewart is defined as adjusted operating income 
minus a capital charge; the basic assumption underlying EVA© is that managers only add 
value to their organization when the resulting profits exceed the cost of capital (Stewart, 
2002). In addition, EVA© improves on residual income by adjusting for ‘distortions’ in 
the accounting model of performance measurement4 (Stewart, 2002; Biddle et al, 1997). 
EVA© is claimed to be the best surrogate for or the predictor of future share price 
performance; an increase in EVA© should therefore result in an increase in future cash 
flows (Stewart, 2002; Stern et al, 1995). However, Otley (1999) argues that it needs to be 
recognized that EVA© remains an historic income measure and does not anticipate the 
future earnings, despite the existence of predictions based on stock market valuations.  
 
Non-financial performance measures 
Another line of performance measurement innovations has focused on the use of non-
financial performance measures5; examples include the Balanced scorecard concept 
(Kaplan & Norton, 2001, 1992) and the EFQM-model (EFQM, 2004). Non-financial 
performance measures are defined as measures that provide performance information in 
non-monetary terms; examples include customer response time, productivity, market 
share, customer satisfaction, innovation/new product development and employee turnover 
                                                 
3
 EVA is a trademark of the Stern Stewart Corporation.  
4
 One essential adjustment for accounting distortions is the amortization of investments in soft assets or 
intangibles. Stewart (2002) argues that investments in intangibles ought to be capitalized like any other 
asset and depreciated over estimates of their economic lives. As a result, current operating profit (or 
NOPAT, in EVA-terms) would not be distorted by investments in soft assets that are expected to pay off in 
the near future.  
5
 It should be noticed that the balanced scorecard and the EFQM model represent as an integrated set of 
measures (i.e., linking non-financial and financial measures) rather than solely non-financial measures 
(EFQM, 2004; Kaplan & Norton, 2001; 1992). However, both concepts supplement financial measures 
with non-financial measures; as such, the non-financial measures are considered as key in this aspect.  
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; AICPA, 2001). Proponents of BSC and EFQM-model 
contend that many of these variables are leading indicators of future profitability (see 
Ittner et al, 2003a; Said et al, 2003; Hendricks & Singhal, 2001, 1997; Kaplan & Norton, 
2001; Ittner & Larcker, 2001, 1998). However, previous research has provided mixed 
evidence on the appropriateness of the balanced scorecard (and, more general, non-
financial measures) for translating strategy into performance measures (Banker et al, 
2004, 2000; Ittner et al, 2003a; Malina & Selto, 2001; Lipe & Salterio, 2000).   
 
Subjective performance measures 
Finally, theory suggests that subjective measures may be appropriate performance 
measures if it is difficult to define objective performance targets or when it is difficult to 
measure results (Prendergast, 2000; Bushman et al, 1996). Subjective performance 
measures (sometimes defined as ‘individual performance evaluation’; see Bushman et al, 
1996) can be defined as measures that are based on factors other than the worker’s 
performance (see Prendergast, 2002a). Subjectivity can be introduced in several ways, 
which are often used in combination (Gibbs et al, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003a): (1) the use of 
qualitative, subjective performance measures, (2) flexibility in weighting quantitative 
performance measures when evaluating performance, and (3) the discretion to use other 
performance measures than the performance measures previously specified. In this 
research project, the focus is on the first option, i.e., the use of qualitative subjective 
measures such as, for example, managerial intuition6  (Andersen, 2000) and competence 
management (Wright & Snell, 1991). Subjective performance measures are able to take 
                                                 
6
 Although it may be argued that managerial intuition may also include the second and third option, i.e., 
flexibility in weighing performance measures or including other performance measures than those specified 
previously.  
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‘difficult to measure’ strategic aspects (such as employee skills and attitudes, intangible 
capital) into account. However, previous research (Gibbs et al, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003a; 
Prendergast & Topel, 1996) suggests that subjective performance measures can have 
negative effects (favouritism in bonus awards, high influence costs) if the evaluation is 
unfair or biased.  
 
2.2 Contingency theory and performance measurement 
2.2.1 Contingency theory  
Contingency-based research has a long history in the study of management control 
systems (Chenhall, 2003). Contingency theory states that the design and use of control 
systems is dependent upon the context of the organizational setting (Fisher, 1998; Otley, 
1980). Previous research has identified a number of variables that affect the effectiveness 
of a management control system, including strategy, the nature of the environment, 
(national) culture, size, and industry (see Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1998; Chapman, 1997; 
Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1980; Gordon & Miller, 1976). Most contingency studies 
have focused on the use of budgets in organizations (see Hartmann, 2000 for a review); 
there is very little contingency research on the use of ‘new’ performance measurement 
instruments (Chenhall, 2003). This study extends previous contingency research in 
management accounting to include more ‘contemporary’ performance measures (as well 
as ‘traditional’ performance measures).  
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2.2.2 Goals and strategies 
A central contingent variable is the objectives and strategies that an organization decides 
to pursue (Otley, 1999). Contingency theory generally starts with the notion that the 
organizational objectives should be stated, and that strategies to achieve those goals 
should be adopted and implemented (Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Fisher, 1998). For the 
purposes of this paper, I distinguish among the overarching goal(s) of the organization, 
corporate strategy and business unit strategy. This distinction is important since the 
literature (Ittner & Larcker, 2001) suggests that ignoring higher-level strategic choices 
made by the firm may result in a misspecification of the relation between lower-level 
strategies and the design of the accounting system. 
 
Goals 
Organizational objectives are likely to affect the mechanisms that have been put in place 
to measure and monitor goal attainment (Otley, 1999). Since the mid-1990s, the literature 
on management control systems has emphasized on the creation of firm value through the 
identification, measurement and management of the drivers of customer value, 
organizational innovation, and shareholder returns (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Most 
economic value measures have been marketed as focusing (lower-level) managers’ minds 
on the delivery of shareholder value (Otley, 1999); as such, economic value measures 
serve as surrogates for the (nonexistent) stock price (Garvey & Milbourn, 2000). 
Consulting firms claim that their proprietary economic value measure correlates more 
closely with stock returns than either traditional accounting measures or the measures of 
rival firms do (Myers, 1996). For example, Stern Stewart claims that EVA© accounts for 
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nearly 50% of the changes in market value added (Stern et al, 1995). However, empirical 
research in this area is contradictory: for example, Biddle et al (1997) find that earnings 
appear to be more closely related to stock price performance than economic value 
measures. On the other hand, research by Wallace (1997) indicates that the stock market 
reacts favourably to the introduction of economic value compensation systems. While the 
avowed goal of the economic value measures is to increase shareholder wealth, the 
relation between goals and non-financial or subjective performance measures is 
somewhat more diffuse. Firms may use non-financial value drivers to identify and 
manage value drivers in order to increase shareholder value (Banker et al, 2004; Ittner et 
al, 2003b; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 2001b; Banker et al, 2000). 
Similarly, subjective measures may be used to complement perceived weaknesses in 
quantitative performance measures (Gibbs et al, 2004); as such, both non-financial and 
subjective measures may be related to shareholder value. On the other hand, non-
financial and subjective measures may also be related to ‘stakeholder value goals’ (rather 
than solely shareholder value). For example, Kaplan (2001) indicates that the balanced 
scorecard can be a useful tool in non-profit organizations since it provides the 
opportunity to measure multiple aspects of performance. Research by Cavalluzzo & Ittner 
(2004) indicates that objective performance measures are less useful in non-profit 
organizations when goals are difficult to quantify, measure and interpret (for example, 
due to the fact that there are multiple stakeholders). Summarizing, non-financial and 
subjective performance measures are less likely to be explicitly linked to shareholder 
value in comparison to economic value measures. This results in the following 
hypothesis: 
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H1: 
The importance of shareholder value is (a) positively associated with the use of economic 
value measures, and (b) not related to the use of non-financial or subjective measures.  
 
Strategies 
Strategy has been described as a pattern of decisions about the organization’s future 
(Mintzberg, 1978), which take on meaning when implemented through the organization’s 
structure and processes (Miles & Snow, 1978). An organization’s strategy can also be 
defined as the match between the organization’s resources and skills, and the 
environmental opportunities and uncertainties it faces (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). For the 
purposes of this research project, I distinguish between corporate strategy and business 
unit strategy (or strategic mission).   
 
Corporate strategy is primarily concerned with answering the question: what set of 
businesses should we be in (including what businesses to acquire or divest), and how 
should we structure and finance the company? Organizations can be classified into one of 
three categories7 with regard to their corporate strategy (Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996; Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978). A ‘single business’ organization operates in one line of business; in 
its most extreme form, the organization may be totally committed to one industry. A 
‘related diversified’ organization operates in several industries; it possesses core 
competencies that benefit many of its business units and accomplishes diversification by 
                                                 
7
 Some authors recognize four corporate strategies: single business, by-product, related diversified and pure 
diversified firms (Mintzberg, 1996, p. 710; Vancil, 1980). The ‘by-product form’ is an intermediate form 
between the single business and the related diversified firm.  
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relating new businesses to old. These organizations set out to exploit operating synergies 
across businesses. Related diversified organizations typically grow through internal 
research and development. Finally, an ‘unrelated diversified’ organization (or 
conglomerate) operates in a number of businesses and industries that are unrelated to one 
another. The headquarters of an unrelated diversified organization function as a holding 
company, lending money to business units that are expected to have high financial 
returns. Textbooks in strategy and accounting suggest that corporate management at 
unrelated diversified firms has its background mainly in finance, and that it has little 
familiarity with the different industries a diversified firm is operating in (Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2004; Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996, p. 714). As a result, they may not be able 
to interpret the non-financial and subjective performance measures of individual business 
units (due to information asymmetry). Consistent with this notion is that previous 
experimental research (Banker et al, 2004; Lipe & Salterio, 2000) suggests that ‘unique’ 
performance measures may be ignored (i.e., used to a little extent) when evaluating 
performance. For example, Lipe & Salterio (2000) found that only ‘common’ measures 
(i.e. measures common to multiple and diverse units, such as financial performance) are 
included in superiors’ evaluations of business unit’s performance; ‘unique’ measures (i.e. 
measures that are unique to a particular unit, such as non-financial or subjective 
performance) do not appear to affect superior’s evaluations. Previous empirical research 
in a major financial services firm (Ittner et al, 2003b) indicates that it is almost 
impossible to adequately weigh performance subjectively on multiple dimensions. In 
addition, balanced scorecards appear to be dominated by financial and corporate or 
division-wide performance measures rather than non-financial and/or subsidiary 
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performance measures (Ittner & Larcker, 1998). As such, non-financial and subjective 
measures are less likely to be useful for business unit evaluation in diversified firms, 
since it is difficult to compare the multiple performance dimensions across units. On the 
other hand, economic value measures may provide one common measure to compare the 
performance of different business units. The previous review results in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: 
A single business (unrelated diversified) firm strategy is (a) negatively (positively) 
related to the use of economic value measures, and (b) positively (negatively) related to 
the use of non-financial and subjective performance measures.  
 
Strategic missions deal with how to create and maintain a competitive advantage in each 
of the businesses in which an organization participates (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). At the 
business level, strategy focuses on how to compete in a particular industry or 
product/market segment. Strategic mission is concerned with product/market 
segmentation choices and with the stage of product/market evolution (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978, p. 29). Different strategic mission typologies and variables have been used in 
research on the relation between management accounting systems and strategy 
(Langfield-Smith, 1997). For example, Miles & Snow (1978) focus on the rate of change 
in products of markets and use three successful organizational types: defenders, 
prospectors and analyzers. Miller & Friesen (1982) categorize firms as conservative or 
entrepreneurial, using the extent of product innovation. Porter (1985) describes three 
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generic strategies: cost leadership, differentiation and focus. Finally, the classification of 
build, hold, harvest and divest focuses on variations in strategic missions (Langfield-
Smith, 1997; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1993; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985); this 
classification is considered most relevant for this research project. The choice of strategic 
mission signifies the organization's intended trade-off between market share growth and 
maximizing short-term earnings and cash flow. The critical success factors associated 
with a build strategy, such as new product development, innovation and research & 
development, are difficult to quantify (Langfield-Smith, 1997) and will materialize in the 
long term. As a result, build firms (i.e., firms oriented towards growth) are more likely to 
rely on non-financial and subjective performance measures. Previous analytical (Dutta & 
Reichelstein, 2003; Datar et al, 2001) as well as empirical research in this area (Said et al, 
2003; Ittner et al, 1997; Govindarajan, 1988; Gupta, 1987; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985) 
is consistent with this notion: a build mission is associated with the use of non-financial 
and subjective performance measurement systems. The use of financial measures 
(accounting performance measures as well as economic value measures) is likely to 
remain the same across strategic missions: financial measures may be used to control 
‘innovative excess’, to facilitate organizational learning or to have a ‘common 
denominator’ (Dent, 1990; Simons, 1987). This results in the following hypotheses: 
 
H3:  
A build (harvest) strategic mission is (a) not related to the use of economic value 
measures, and (b) positively (negatively) associated with the use of non-financial and 
subjective measures.  
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2.2.3 Culture 
Culture can be defined as a set of cognitions (such as fundamental assumptions, values, 
behavioral norms and expectations) shared by members of a social unit (O’Reilly et al, 
1991).  Culture is hypothesized to be one of the main determinants of the use of 
performance measures (Nahm et al, 2004; Bititci et al, 2004; Baird et al, 2004). Several 
authors in organizational literature (Quinn & Cameron, 1999, 1983; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 
1983; Miller & Friesen, 1983; Ouchi, 1979) suggest that organizational culture may be 
related to the design, use and success of administrative mechanisms. Several 
organizational cultures have been recognized in literature (see Cartwright & Cooper, 
1993; Deshpandé & Parasuraman, 1986; Smircich, 1983); a rather well-known distinction 
is that among power, role, task/achievement and person cultures (Harrison, 1972). A 
power culture refers to a culture where power is centralized; they tend to function on 
implicit rather than explicit rules (i.e., social/clan controls; Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2003; Ouchi, 1979). In addition, individual members are motivated by a sense of personal 
loyalty to the ‘boss’ (patriarchal power) or fear of punishment (autocratic power). Role 
cultures refer to bureaucratic, hierarchical cultures that emphasize rules, procedures and 
regulations concerning the way work is conducted (i.e., behavioral controls; Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2003; Ouchi, 1979). In addition, role requirement and boundaries of 
authority are clearly defined. Task/achievement cultures are characterized by an emphasis 
on the achievement of goals; the organization’s structure, functions and activities are all 
evaluated in terms of their contribution to the goal of the organization (i.e., results 
controls; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Ouchi, 1979). Task cultures are characterized 
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by high levels of worker autonomy; the way work is organized is determined by the task 
requirements (for example, MBO-programs). Thus, ‘task culture organizations’ are 
hypothesized to use financial and non-financial performance measures, while ‘power and 
role cultures’ are expected to rely to a larger extent on ‘subjective performance measures’ 
or other controls (behavior, clan controls). This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: 
Task cultures (power/role cultures) are (a) positively (negatively) associated with the use 
of economic value measures and non-financial measures, and (b) negatively (positively) 
associated with the use of subjective measures.  
 
2.2.4 Environmental Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty refers to top managers’ perceived inability to predict an 
organization’s external environment accurately (Tymon et al, 1998; Milliken, 1987). 
Generally, environmental uncertainty relates to the unpredictability of actions by 
suppliers, competitors, customers, financial markets, government and labor unions 
(Tymon et al, 1998; Miles & Snow, 1978). The relation between environmental 
uncertainty and economic value measures may go two ways. On one hand, if economic 
value measures are just ‘recalculated’ accounting measures, they will not provide 
additional insight in the performance of managers; in that case, uncertainty will not be 
related to the use of economic value measure. On the other hand, economic value 
measures include a capital charge which is based on the (risk-adjusted) cost of capital, 
which requires managers to make a trade-off between risk and return. In that case, 
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economic value measures may provide additional information to traditional accounting 
performance measures and may be used to a larger extent when uncertainty increases. 
Previous literature also indicates that environmental uncertainty typically results in the 
use of additional information processing (i.e., the use of non-financial and subjective 
performance measures; Chenhall, 2003; Gordon & Miller, 1976). In addition, external 
uncertainty adds observation error to accounting-based performance evaluation 
(Prendergast, 2002b). As a result, principals may introduce non-financial and subjective 
measures to obtain provide additional information on the effort of managers (Prendergast, 
2002a). Previous empirical research has indicated that an increase in environmental 
uncertainty is positively related to the use of non-financial and subjective performance 
measures (Said et al, 2003; Ittner et al, 1997; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Govindarajan & 
Gupta, 1985; Govindarajan, 1984; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984) while the relation with 
economic value measures is unknown. This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: 
Environmental uncertainty is (a) not related to the use of economic value measures, and 
(b) positively related to the use of non-financial and subjective measures.  
 
2.2.5 Size 
Previous research has indicated that large organizations are associated with more formal 
procedures and sophisticated performance evaluation systems (Chenhall, 2003) and tend 
to introduce economic value measures (Bouwens & Van Lent, 2003) as well as non-
financial measures (Said et al, 2003; Hoque & James, 2000). In addition, it is not likely 
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that subjective measures are used in large organizations due to the large costs of influence 
activities (Ittner et al, 2003a; Prendergast & Topel, 1996). This results in the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H6: 
Size is (a) positively related to the use of economic value and non-financial measures, 
and (b) negatively related to the use of subjective measures.  
 
2.2.6 Industry 
Finally, the potential impact of industry is taken in account since previous research 
suggests that manufacturing companies may use economic value measures (Garvey & 
Milbourn, 2000) and non-financial performance measures to support specific 
manufacturing strategies (see, for example, Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Perera 
et al, 1997; Abernethy & Lillis, 1995). Other research suggests that non-manufacturing 
firms also use non-financial performance measures (Ittner et al, 2003b). Finally, some 
authors (Gibbs et al, 2004) suggest that an increase in long-term investments in non-
tangible assets (which is more likely to be present in the services industry) results in an 
increase in the use of subjective performance measures. This results in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H7:  
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Manufacturing (service) industry is (a) positively (negatively) associated with the use of 
economic value measures, (b) not related to the use of non-financial measures and (c) 
negatively (positively) associated with the use of subjective measures.  
2.3 Impact on performance 
In addition to evaluating the impact of strategy on performance, I also investigate 
whether an alignment of strategy and performance measurement systems results in an 
increase in performance. Previous research has generally indicated that users are 
generally more satisfied with the ‘new financial’ and non-financial measures (Ittner et al, 
2003b; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b); also, non-financial 
measures appear to result in the achievement of executives’ goals in case of build 
strategies (Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). However, there has been relatively little 
research on the relation between the use of the ‘new’ performance measures and financial 
performance (exceptions are Davis & Albright, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003b; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2001, 1997; Biddle et al, 1997; Wallace, 1997). Ittner et al (2003b) indicate that 
this is rather surprising, considering that most advocates of the ‘improved’ performance 
measures indicate that the ultimate objective is to increase economic performance. In this 
study, I investigate whether an alignment of the performance measurement system to the 
strategic and contextual characteristics of the firm results in an increased performance 
compared to ‘non-aligned firms’. This results in the following hypothesis:  
 
H8: 
Alignment of the performance measurement system to the strategic and contextual 
characteristics of the firm is positively associated with performance.  
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2.4 Summary 
The following table summarizes the hypothesized results: 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The previous table provides the hypothesized relations between strategic and contextual 
variables and the use of performance measures. Based on several theoretical arguments, 
there are no hypotheses for a relationship between an organization’s goals and strategies, 
culture, uncertainty, size, industry, and the use of accounting-based performance 
measures. First of all, economic value, non-financial and subjective performance 
measures often augment rather than replace accounting based performance measures 
(Baker et al, 1994; Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984). Second, the 
reliance on accounting performance measures (RAPM) literature suggests that budgets 
and other accounting performance measures remain valid even in case of differences in 
strategy, culture, uncertainty, size or industry (Hartmann, 2000). However, different 
circumstances may result in the fact that accounting performance measures (such as 
budgets) may be used in a different way (see Simons, 2000; Abernethy & Brownell, 
1999; Chapman, 1997). 
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3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
A sample of 201 medium-sized and large organizations operating in the Netherlands, 
drawn from the REACH CD-ROM database8, is used for this research project. Two 
criteria were used to select these organizations for our study: they had to employ at least 
100 employees in the Netherlands and have sales of at least  45 mln. After contacting 
the companies, it has become clear that 21 of the companies has gone bankrupt or has 
merged with other organizations, resulting in a target population of 180 companies9. 
Since previous research indicates that the finance department is generally involved in 
performance measurement (see AICPA, 2001; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998; 
Hendricks et al, 1996), the survey has been sent to the chief financial officer (CFO) or the 
controller of the selected organizations. Respondents included CFOs (34%), controllers 
(57%) and other respondents (9%). On average, the respondents were working for 4 years 
in their current function. The data collection process results in 61 (at least partially) 
useable responses from the 180 organizations in the target group (a response rate of 
34%). Telephone reminders indicated that reasons for non-participation include lack of 
time, internal developments (merger with other party or restructurings) and lack of a 
formal performance measurement system. Compared to data from the Dutch Bureau of 
Statistics on firms in the Netherlands, financial institutions are overrepresented while the 
real estate, renting and business activities and, to a lesser extent, construction companies 
                                                 
8
 REACH is the name of a CD-ROM database that contains data on all organizations registered at the 
Dutch Chamber of Commerce.  
9
 In addition, 27 companies could not be contacted by telephone; a survey has been sent to them yet return 
characteristics for this sub-population are unknown.  
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are underrepresented in the sample10. Table 2 presents a profile of the responding 
organizations. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
In this section, the measurement and validation process is discussed. The survey 
questions that have been used are presented in Appendix A. Specific information on the 
survey instruments is provided below. 
 
Importance shareholder value 
The importance of the shareholder value goal is proxied by stock listing. It is likely that 
firms listed at a stock exchange will have shareholder value as an explicit objective. 
Respondents have been asked to indicate whether their firm is listed on a stock exchange. 
A dummy variable labelled SHAREHVL is coded 1 if the company is listed on a stock 
exchange, and coded 0 otherwise. To validate this measure, we correlated the 
SHAREHVL variable to answers on a survey question on the importance of shareholder 
value, stock price and dividends to top management of the organization. The results 
indicate that SHAREHVL is positively and significantly related (=0.65, p<0.01) to the 
                                                 
10
 The non-profit sector was not intended to be included in the survey; however, the shares for some of the 
companies included in the sample are completely or partially held by government organizations (transport 
companies, IT companies, etc.). One respondent indicated that it is operating in the non-profit sector; the 
reason for this answer could be that its shares are held completely by the government.  
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importance of shareholder value goals. As such, SHAREHVL may be considered a proxy 
for the importance of shareholder value maximization.  
 
Corporate strategy 
Corporate strategy has been measured by using answers to a question adopted from 
Christie et al (2003) and Vancil (1978). Respondents have been asked to classify their 
firm as being a single business, related diversified or unrelated diversified firm. 
Compared to Christie et al (2003), unrelated diversified firms appear to be 
underrepresented in our sample. For the purposes of this research project, a dummy 
variable (SINGLEBUS) is created that distinguishes between single business firms 
(coded 1) and diversified firms (coded 0). This measure is validated by correlating the 
SINGLEBUS measure to other organizational variables which, according to strategic 
management literature should be related to corporate strategy11 (see Quinn & Cameron, 
1983; Miller & Friesen, 1983). The results indicate that the correlations are mostly in the 
hypothesized direction, yet not significant (p>0.28). 
 
Strategic Mission 
The measure for strategic mission is derived from Govindarajan & Gupta (1985). Similar 
to their research, this study views alternative strategic missions as spanning a continuous 
spectrum. Respondents have been asked to indicate the percentages for each of the 
relevant mission descriptions provided to them (see Appendix A). The strategic mission 
measure was derived as follows: a value of +1 was attached to a build strategy, a 0 to a 
                                                 
11
 We correlated our corporate strategy measure with variables [hypothesized effect] such as size [-], 
uncertainty [+], age [-], and life cycle stage (growth [+] versus maturity [-]). Except for uncertainty, the 
actual correlations are in the hypothesized direction. 
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hold strategy, a –1 to a harvest strategy and a –2 to a divest strategy. The percentage 
breakdown provided by the respondent was then used to arrive at a weighted average 
strategy index for the firm12. A a high score represents a focus on a growth strategy, 
while a low score on this measure represents a focus on a hold and/or divest strategy. To 
validate this measure (labelled BUILDSTR), we compared the BUILDSTR variable to 
the sales growth data for 3213 companies for 1 and 2 years, respectively (i.e., sales growth 
for 2000-2001 and 1999-200114). The Spearman correlation between BUILDSTR and 
both measures of sales growth is positive, yet not significant (p>0.41)15. This may 
indicate that there is a difference between intended and realized strategy (Mintzberg, 
1978). 
 
Culture 
The measure for culture is based on the distinction among power, role, task/achievement 
and person/support cultures (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Harrison, 1972). Respondents 
have been asked to select the description that best describes the culture in their 
organization. We distinguish between task culture (TASKCULT) and other cultures16; the 
score for TASKCULT is 1 if respondents have indicated that the dominant culture of 
their organization is a task culture, and 0 for other cultures.  
                                                 
12
 It should be noticed that I measure strategic mission at the corporate level, not at the BU level. That is, 
respondents at the corporate level have been asked to indicate the strategic mission of their organization; as 
such, a high score represents a growth strategy. Within the organization, different business units may have 
different strategic missions.  
13
 Not all companies could be identified (the survey was anonymous); in addition, data were not always 
available.  
14
 To correct for skewness of the performance data, we used the Spearman rank correlation.  
15
 One reason may be that there is a difference between intended and emergent strategy; see Mintzberg, 
(1996). In this research project, I assume that strategy is intended and performance measures are used to 
implement strategy (see Simons, 2000). 
16
 The distribution of this variable is such that 70% of the respondents indicates that their firm’s culture is 
characterized as a task culture; a further separation is impossible due to the rather limited number of 
observations for the other cultural types recognized in the survey.  
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Uncertainty 
The measure for environmental uncertainty (labeled UNCRTTY) is based on an 
instrument first developed by Miles & Snow (1978) and used by, among others, Kren & 
Kerr (1993) and Govindarajan (1984). Respondents have been asked to indicate the 
predictability of the environment on a scale from 1 (=never) to 5 (=always). Relevant 
items from the environment include suppliers, competitors, customers, financial markets, 
government and labour unions. Confirmatory  Factor Analysis17 (CFA) has been applied 
to verify that all survey questions on uncertainty load on one factor. The CFA-results (not 
provided here) indicate that all uncertainty factors load on one component (all factor 
loadings above 0.39). Cronbach’s alpha is just below acceptable limits (0.55, while the 
lower limit is generally at 0.60 to 0.70; see Hair et al [1998]). The UNCRTTY measure 
has been used by summarizing the reversed scores on the instrument, such that a high 
score on this variable represents a relatively uncertain environment, while a low score 
represents a relatively stable environment (see Appendix A). To validate this measure, 
the standard deviation for the return on capital employed (ROCE) for 4 years for 32 
companies has been calculated18. The Spearman correlation19 between the standard 
deviation in ROCE and the uncertainty measure is positive, yet not significant (p>0.13). 
Considering the previous results, the results for uncertainty should be interpreted with 
some caution. 
                                                 
17
 CFA is theoretically superior to exploratory factor analysis if we have a theory on how factors should 
move together (Fabrigar et al, 1999). 
18
 The standard deviation in return on asset measures has been used as an alternative measure of risk (Miller 
& Bromiley, 1990).  
19
 We use the Spearman correlation since tests indicate that the standard deviation in return on capital 
employed is skewed to the right. The Pearson correlation is positive, and significant (=0.54, p<0.01). 
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Size 
The measure for size (labeled SIZE) is based on the number of full time equivalents 
(fte’s) employed in the organization. For validation purposes, two additional measures for 
size have been included in the survey: sales (in mln euros) and total assets (in mln euros); 
all measures for size are correlated (>0.63, p<0.01). To correct for skewness, the 
logarithm of the number of fte’s is used as a measure of size.  
 
Industry 
For the purposes of this study, it is possible to distinguish among primary and 
manufacturing industry and other industries by using a dummy variable (labelled 
PRIMMFTG)20. The dummy variable PRIMMFTG is coded 1 if the company is 
operating in the primary or manufacturing industry, and coded 0 otherwise. As such, this 
variable distinguishes among companies with tangible and intangible assets.  
 
Use of Performance measures 
The measure for the use of specific performance measures has been purposefully 
designed for this research project. Based on a review of literature (see section 2), a 
number of performance measures have been selected. Respondents have been asked to 
indicate to what extent they use21 a number of performance measures, such as traditional 
                                                 
20
 The number of responses (61) and the number of variables (7) does not allow the use of more dummy 
variables for different industry types. However, the distinction amongst primary and manufacturing 
industry (mostly fixed assets) and other industries (more intangible assets, such as personnel skills) appears 
to be most essential (see Garvey & Milbourn, 2000). 
21
 We included an additional question on the importance of the performance measurement system for 
several goals. The following percentages of the respondents indicated that the performance measurement 
system was important or very important for: operational decisions (85%), strategic decisions (80%), 
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accounting measures (budgets, return on equity), economic value measures (eg. EVA©, 
Shareholder Value Analysis), non-financial measures (eg. customer satisfaction, quality) 
or subjective performance measures (eg. competence management, managerial intuition). 
Similar to Hoque & James (2000) and Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998b), I measure 
the use of non-financial indicators rather than the use of the BSC- or the EFQM-model. 
Similar to Bushman et al (1996), managerial intuition and competence measures (i.e., 
individual or personal measures) are considered subjective measures.  
 
Again, I use CFA to verify whether the performance measures mentioned in the survey 
load on the four hypothesized variables (i.e., accounting-based, economic value, non-
financial and subjective performance measures). The results from the factor analysis (see 
Appendix B.1) indicate that the variables to a large extent load on the factors in the 
hypothesized way22. The scores for the relevant factors have been summarized for each 
recognized measure23 (i.e., accounting, economic value, non-financial and subjective) 24.  
The resulting measures are labeled ACCTGPMS (accounting performance measures), 
EVMPMS (economic value measures), NONFIN (non-financial measures) and 
SUBJPMS (subjective measures). The alpha coefficients for the scales exceed the 
                                                                                                                                                 
evaluating economic performance (71%), evaluating managerial performance (70%), rewarding employees 
(68%) and communication of strategy (50%). As such, the performance measurement system is used for 
more purposes than solely evaluating and rewarding managers (although this is an important function).   
22
 A number of items were deleted from the original survey to obtain valid measures. For example, risk-
adjusted rates of return were eliminated since they hardly are used among non-financial services firms. 
Second, the CFROI-measure was deleted since its ‘economic value measure factor loadings’ are relatively 
low. Finally, ‘risk measures’ are excluded from the analysis since this measure loaded on the non-financial 
as well as the subjective measure.  
23
 For example, the score for accounting-based performance measures has been calculated by summarizing 
the scores for the use of a comparison of budget to actual results, ROE, ROCE and ROTC. 
24
 Another option is to calculate the percentage for each of these measures as a total of the sum of all 
measures (for example, the sum of scores of the accounting-based performance measures as a percentage of 
all measures used by the organization). However, this measure is considered less informative since it is 
influenced by the number of questions in the survey.  
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conventional 0.70 level (Hair et al, 1998), with the exception of the measure for 
accounting performance measures (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 0.46). As a result, the 
results for accounting performance measures should be interpreted with caution25.  
 
Performance 
Finally, the alignment hypothesis is tested by using one perceptual measure of 
performance (labelled PERFRMNC) and two accounting performance variables: sales 
growth (labelled SALESGR) and return on capital employed (labelled ROCE). The 
measure for perceptual performance is based on the instrument used by Govindarajan & 
Gupta (1985). Respondents have been asked to indicate how their organization performs 
in a number of areas (including sales growth, cost management, profitability, return, 
shareholder value, cash flows, customer orientation, innovation, quality, and personnel 
development). The two accounting measures have been obtained from REACH and are 
measured contemporaneously with the date of the survey (i.e., over 2001). For each 
accounting measure, I obtain two observations: sales growth is measured for 2000-2001 
and for 1999-200126, and return on capital employed is measured over 2001 and over 3 
consecutive years (1999-2001). A closer analysis of the distribution of the accounting 
variables indicates that they are not normally distributed; to correct for skewness, the 
non-parametric Spearman correlation27 has been used in the analysis of performance. 
                                                 
25
 Some additional tests have been performed to verify the robustness of the results; see section 5 of this 
paper. 
26
 Sales growth is calculated as a percentage:  
Sales growth 2000-2001 is calculated as: (sales 2001-sales 2000)/(sales 2000).  
Sales growth 1999-2001 is calculated as: (sales 2001-sales 1999)/(sales 1999) 
27
 Other alternatives to reduce the impact of skewness include using the natural logarithm of the 
performance measures, or using a cap. The first options results in a reduction of the data, since negative 
growth rates cannot be computed. To solve for this, it is possible to set the growth rate at 0 for negative 
growth rates. This results in another problem again, since low growth rates result in negative log-scores 
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3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics and correlations for all dependent and 
independent variables in the estimation models described in the next sections.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 AND 4 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The correlation results indicate that the independent variables appear to be unrelated, 
except for the fact that uncertainty is significantly and negatively related to size and to 
the primary and manufacturing industry (p<0.05). However, the correlation coefficient is 
such that all independent measures can be included in the regression analysis (see Hair et 
al, 1998). In addition to that, the use of non-financial measures is related to strategic 
mission, size, and to other performance measures (accounting performance measures, 
economic value measures and subjective measures). Finally, with the exception of the 
relation between the use of subjective performance measures and perceived performance 
(p=0.09), there appears to be no statistically significant relation between the use of 
specific performance measures and perceived or accounting performance (results not 
presented here)28. For the purposes of this research project, variables have been 
standardized since most distance measures are quite sensitive to differing scales or 
                                                                                                                                                 
while negative growth rates would result in a log-score of 0. A lot of information is sacrificed if all 
negative scores and low scores are set at 0. The second option (using caps, for example, all sales growth 
rates exceeding 100% are set at 100%) does not solve the skewness problem. As a result, non-parametric 
correlation is used when testing the impact of performance.  
28
 Again, we use Spearman correlation (a non-parametric test) to investigate the relation between the use of 
performance measures and performance. This is necessary since analysis indicate that performance is not 
normally distributed; it also solves for the rather limited number of observations.  
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magnitude among the variables29. Standard scores have been used in the remainder of this 
research project, with the exception of section 4.1.  
4 Results 
4.1 Diffusion rate of ‘new’ performance measures 
Table 5 presents information on the use of several performance measures (both 
‘traditional’ as well as ‘contemporary’) in Dutch organizations.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5 indicates that budgeting is still used most often for performance evaluation: 93% 
of the respondents indicate that the comparison of budgets to actual results is still the 
most important performance measure. This result is consistent with other studies in this 
area (see Ferreira & Otley, 2004; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b). Other 
‘traditional’ accounting measures, such as return on equity and return on capital 
employed, appear to be used less extensively (approximately 40% of the respondents 
indicates that it uses these measures often or always to evaluate performance). Adoption 
of risk-adjusted rates of return (RAROC, RORAC) is low (approximately 5%) in Dutch 
organizations. About 30% of the organizations uses a economic value added (EVA©, 
CFROI) while approximately 16% uses a shareholder value added measure. Contrary to 
                                                 
29
 In general, variables with larger dispersion (i.e., larger standard deviations) have more impact on the final 
value (Hair et al [1998]). 
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expectations is that these measures are correlated (=0.28, p=0.04); I expected a negative 
correlation since previous literature (Myer, 1996) indicates that these performance 
measures are marketed by competing consulting firms. One reason may be that firms 
design their own measures similar to those of the consulting firms30. The adoption of 
economic value measures in the Netherlands is fairly similar to adoption rates31 other 
countries (see Ferreira & Otley, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003b; Ittner & Larcker, 1998). About 
50% to 60% of the firms in the Netherlands appears to use non-financial measures on an 
extensive scale. This adoption rate is similar to some research projects from Australia 
(see Hoque & James, 2000), yet higher than in other countries (compare Ferreira & 
Otley, 2004 in Portugal; and Ittner et al, 2003b in the financial services sector in the 
USA). Similar to other research projects (Hoque & James, 2000; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; 
Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b) is also that the innovation performance measures 
are used to a (much) lesser extent than other non-financial performance measures. 
Finally, the subjective measures (competence management, intuition higher management) 
are used by about 15%-20% of the firms on a regular basis. The results from this study 
are consistent with the findings by Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998b) that financial 
measures remain important issues in management control, yet that they are being 
supplemented with a variety of non-financial and, to a lesser extent, economic value and 
subjective performance measures.  
 
                                                 
30
 For example, a Dutch food company uses performance measures similar to the previously described 
economic value measures yet has designed them internally rather than purchased them from consulting 
firms.  
31
 An exception is Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998, who report much higher adoption rates for economic 
value measures; however, their adoption percentages are in general (much) higher compared to other 
studies in this area.  
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4.2 Determinants of the use of performance measures 
Empirical testing of the hypotheses derived earlier involved assessing the impact of the 
strategic and contextual factors on the use of several performance measures (accounting 
performance measures, economic value measures, nonfinancial measures and subjective 
measures). To estimate the impact of the contextual factors, the following empirical 
model is defined:  
 
PERFMEASij = αj + β1j* SHAREHVLi + β2j * SINGLEBUSi + β3j * BUILDSTRi + 
β4j* TASKCULTi + β5j * UNCRTTYi + β6j* SIZEi + β7j*PRIMMFTGi 
+ εi 
 
Where:  
PERFMEASij = Use of performance measure type j (i.e., accounting performance 
measure; ‘economic value’ performance measure; non-financial 
performance measure; or subjective performance measure) by firm i; 
SHAREHVLi = Importance of shareholder value (i.e., 1=firm is listed on stock 
exchange, 0=firm is not listed on stock exchange) for firm i; 
SINGLEBUSi =  Corporate strategy (single business firm = 1, rest =0) of firm i; 
BUILDSTRi = Strategic mission of firm i; 
TASKCULTi = Task culture dummy variable (i.e., 1=task culture; 0=other culture) for 
firm i; 
UNCRTTYi = Uncertainty for firm i; 
SIZEi = Size (log of the number of fte’s) of firm i;  
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PRIMMFTGi = Industry dummy (i.e., 1=primary and manufacturing industry, 0=other 
industries) for firm i;  
εi = Error term of firm i. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 6 indicates that, consistent with expectations, the use of accounting based 
performance measure is not influenced by any of the contingency factors. These results 
are consistent with expectations; previous research has indicated that accounting 
performance measures are used differently rather than that they are abandoned 
(Hartmann, 2000; Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Simons, 1987).  
 
Consistent with my hypotheses is that the importance of the shareholder value goal is 
significantly and positively related to the use of economic value performance measures 
(p<0.05); apparently, economic value measures are used to align lower level managerial 
decision to shareholder value goals. The other strategic variables (corporate strategy, 
strategic mission) do not have an impact on the application of economic value measures. 
Part of the effect of corporate strategy may be picked up by size; larger companies appear 
to use economic value measures to a larger extent (p<0.10). Another reason for the 
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impact of size may be that larger organizations tend to introduce new accounting 
instruments faster than smaller organizations (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b; 
Rogers, 1995). Task culture (p<0.15) and industry (p<0.19) appear to be marginally 
significant, while uncertainty is not associated with the use of ‘economic value 
measures’.  
 
Contrary to my hypothesis is that the importance of the shareholder value goal (p<0.10) 
is positively related to the use of non-financial measures; apparently, firms use non-
financial measures to support the quest for shareholder value. Also contrary to 
expectations is that a single business strategy is negatively, yet not significant related to 
the use of non-financial measures. Consistent with my hypotheses is that a strategic build  
mission (p<0.01), task culture (p<0.10) and size (p<0.05) are positively associated with 
the use of non-financial measures. The results for a build mission are consistent with 
previous research (Chenhall, 2003; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). The results for culture 
suggest that some organizational cultures (task culture) appear to reinforce the 
implementation of strategy through performance measurement, while other cultures 
(power culture, role culture) may not rely on performance measures to implement 
strategy. Also consistent with other research (Chenhall, 2003; Hoque & James, 2000; 
Miller & Friesen, 1983) is that larger firms appear to rely on sophisticated, formal control 
systems that also provide information on customer satisfaction, quality, and employees. 
The other variables (uncertainty, industry) are not significantly related to the use of non-
financial performance measures.  
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Finally, contrary to my hypotheses is that the use of subjective measures is not related to 
either one of the contingency variables. One explanation may be that firms interpret 
objective performance measures subjectively and include other measures than those 
previously specified, rather than use subjective performance measures (see Gibbs et al, 
2004; Ittner et al, 2003a).  
4.3 Impact of performance measures on performance 
The preceding tests provide evidence on the relation between strategic and contextual 
variables and the use of specific performance measures. However, as discussed 
previously, theory contends that performance measurement practices must be aligned 
with the firm’s strategic and contextual factors to increase performance (Otley, 1980). I 
investigate this claim by examining whether there is a positive relation between the 
alignment of the performance measurement system to strategic and contextual variables, 
and performance. In other words, I investigate whether firms that have aligned their 
performance measurement system to their strategic and contextual characteristics 
outperform peers with ‘non-aligned’ performance measurement systems (Ittner et al, 
2003b; Duncan & Moores, 1989; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985). In order to test this 
hypothesis, I use regression analysis to calculate ‘misalignment measures’ for the two 
specific performance measures (i.e., economic value measures and non-financial 
measures) for which significant results have been found. This yields two (the importance 
of the shareholder value goal and size for economic value measures) respectively four 
(the importance of the shareholder value goal, strategic mission, culture and size for non-
financial performance measures) regressions. For each regression, the residual (i.e., the 
error term) is saved. The proxy for alignment is then computed by taking the square root 
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of the summarized squared residuals32 from these regressions. This approach assumes 
that the residual from the regressions indicates the level of ‘misalignment’; that is, if 
firms have correctly chosen their performance measurement systems the residual from 
the regressions should approach zero (Ittner et al, 2003b; Duncan & Moores, 1989; 
Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985). Any deviation from the estimated models (i.e., too much or 
too little measurement emphasis) should be negatively33 associated with performance 
(both the perceptual as well as the accounting performance). The resulting performance 
tests are presented in table 7.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 7 indicates that, contrary to hypothesis 8, there is no significant relation (p>0.10) 
between the alignment of the performance measurement system to strategic and other 
contextual factors, and the performance (neither perceptual nor accounting performance). 
In other words, firms that align their performance measurement system to the strategic 
and operational characteristics of their firm do not outperform their ‘nonaligned’ 
competitors. Although contrary to my hypothesis, this finding is consistent with results 
from previous research (Ittner et al, 2003b). One reason may be that it is more important 
                                                 
32
 The residual from each individual regression represents: (1) measurement error in the variables, (2) 
estimation error in the model, and (3) the potential mismatch of performance measurement system of the 
firm with regard to that specific variable (i.e., size, industry, strategic mission or culture). For this analysis, 
the assumption is that the third part is substantial.   
33
 The squared root from the squared residuals is used in this analysis in order to obtain a proxy for the 
deviation from the optimal value. Larger values are hypothesized to be negatively associated with 
performance in these tests (Ittner et al, 2003b).  
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to have an adequate (adaptation of) strategy rather than an adequate performance 
measurement system that solely supports the implementation of strategy (see Mintzberg, 
1978). In sum, the evidence in table 7 provides little support for the hypothesis that a 
misalignment of the performance measurement system to the strategic and contextual 
characteristics of the organization is detrimental to performance.  
4.4 Statistical considerations 
To ensure that the results were robust, a number of tests have been used to evaluate the 
assumptions underlying the regression models and to examine possible data problems. 
First, the models are re-estimated by using the relative rather than the absolute use of 
performance measures (for example, the use of accounting performance measures relative 
to the total number of performance measures considered in this research project). The 
results (not presented here) are generally similar to the results provided previously. Most 
notable deviations from previous results are that the relative use of accounting measures 
is lower in case of larger size (p<0.10), a strategic build mission and a task culture (both 
p<0.15). This is consistent with the results on the use of ‘contemporary’ performance 
measures presented previously (i.e., an increase in the use of ‘contemporary’ performance 
measures results in a relative decrease in the use of ‘traditional’ accounting performance 
measures). For the economic value measures model, we find that primary and 
manufacturing industries appear to use these measures to a larger extent (p<0.10) than 
service-oriented industries. One reason may be that it is difficult to value intangible assets 
(training and development, employee competencies), which are relatively more important 
in the service industry. As a result, the application of economic value measures (that ‘tax’ 
assets through the capital charge) may be more difficult in the service industries. For the 
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non-financial measures model, we find that single business firms appear to use non-
financial measures to a lesser extent than more diversified firms (p<0.05); this is 
consistent with the finding that large, diversified firms use more sophisticated controls. 
Finally, subjective performance measures are used to a lesser extent in large firms than in 
small firms (p<0.10). A reason may be that large firms appear to reduce influence costs 
by reducing reliance on subjective performance measures (Ittner et al, 2003a). The other 
results are similar to the results presented in table 6.  
 
Second, the results for the validity tests presented previously indicate that the measure for 
accounting-based performance measure is questionable. To correct for this, I ran 
regression analyses for each of the separate measures that constitute the accounting-based 
performance measure (i.e., comparison of budget versus actual results, ROE, ROCE and 
ROTC). The results are similar to the results presented previously, with two exceptions: 
the results suggest that size is positively associated with the use of a comparison of 
budget versus actual results (p<0.05). In addition, the importance of the shareholder value 
goal is positively related to the use of return on capital employed measures (p<0.10). 
Finally, a number of tests have been executed to check whether the models suffer from 
ommitted-variable bias34 or heteroskedasticity35; the results from these tests indicate that 
this is not the case.  
                                                 
34
 A RESET test (Verbeek, 2004, p. 63, p. 66) has been used to see whether powers of the dependent 
estimated variable help in explaining the dependent variable. If powers of the dependent estimated variable 
have non-zero coefficients in the auxiliary regression, it is not unlikely that relevant variables are omitted 
from the model. In that case, the inclusion of an additional variable may capture the nonlinearities indicated 
by the test. The results from the RESET-test (not included here) indicate that none of the models appears to 
suffer from non-linear effects or omitted-variable bias. 
35
 The Breusch-Pagan test has been used to test the alternative hypothesis that the error variance depends 
upon the three explanatory variables (Verbeek, 2004). The results from the Breusch-Pagan test (not 
included here) suggest that heteroskedasticity is not likely to be a problem for non-financial or subjective 
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The ‘alignment hypothesis’ (hypothesis 8, i.e., a mismatch between the strategic and 
contextual characteristics of the firm and the design of the performance measurement 
negatively affects performance) has been re-evaluated using the squared root from the 
sum of the squared residuals from the joint regression of the statistically significant 
variables affecting the use of a performance measure. That is, the squared root from the 
sum of the squared residuals from the regression of size and stock exchange listing on the 
use of economic value measures, respectively strategic mission, culture, size and stock 
exchange listing on the non-financial performance measures have been correlated to the 
four measures for performance mentioned previously. Again, I do not find a significant 
relation (p>0.10) between strategic and/or contextual alignment and performance. 
 
Finally, it may be argued that firms jointly decide on their strategy, industries they are 
competing in, size, organizational culture, stock listing, and the design of their 
performance measurement system. These so-called ‘endogeneity problems’ are likely to 
exist in all organizational design studies: many organizational choices are interrelated 
(Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Endogeneity may provide biased and inconsistent results 
(Verbeek, 2004). An assumption in contingency theory is that ‘misfit’ between the 
organizational characteristics and the use of performance measures may occur in some 
organizations for extended periods (Luft & Shields, 2003); however, the validity of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
performance measures. However, the results for the accounting and economic value performance measures 
suggest that the OLS-results may be distorted by heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity may come from the 
industry dummy (p<0.05) in the accounting performance measure model, respectively from stock listing 
(p<0.05) in the economic value measure model. Considering their current significance in the original 
models, it is unlikely that heteroskedasticity affects the significance levels of these variables.  
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assumption is largely unknown. Thus, a key limitation in this research project is that the 
results from this study are biased by endogeneity of the predictor variables.  
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Using data from a survey amongst Dutch firms, I investigate the use and effectiveness of 
several ‘new’ performance measures (including economic value measures, non-financial 
measures and subjective measures). The results indicate that non-financial measures 
appear to be used most often to deal with the allegedly negative effects of traditional 
accounting performance measures; economic value measures and subjective measures are 
used to a much lesser extent. Consistent with previous research is that accounting 
performance measures (budgets, return on investment) are equally important to all 
organizations (Hartmann, 2000; Simons, 1987; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). Economic 
value measures (EVA©, SVA) are appear to be used most often in large firms that find 
the shareholder value goal important (and, relatively, in the primary or manufacturing 
industry and in firms with task cultures). As such, the use of economic value measures 
appears to be used to align managerial decisions to shareholder interests. Non-financial 
performance measures are used mainly in large firms that focus on shareholder value and 
growth (i.e., have build missions) and have task cultures. An increase in size appears to 
be negatively associated with the relative use of subjective performance measures 
(probably to reduce influence costs; Ittner et al, 2003a; Prendergast & Topel, 1996). 
Finally, a closer match between strategic and other contextual factors and the 
performance measurement system of a company does not increase performance.  
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Like all research projects, this study has several limitations. In addition to endogeneity 
problems mentioned previously, some variables that might have been relevant for this 
research project (for example, the allocation of decision rights, Abernethy, Bouwens & 
Van Lent, 2004; Nagar, 2002; Prendergast, 2002b; and the diagnostic or interactive use of 
performance measures, Simons, 2000) have not been included in this research project. 
However, the additional statistical tests indicate that the exclusion of these measures does 
not appear to affect the results. A second limitation is that ‘improper’ subjective 
performance measures may have been used. Although based on a literature review, the 
subjective performance measures (competence management, managerial intuition) listed 
in this research project may not be the performance measures which are considered 
relevant to managers. The subjective use of several variables may result in different 
results (see Gibbs et al, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003a). Third, several dummy variables have 
been used in this research project (the importance of the shareholder goal, corporate 
strategy, culture and industry are all proxied by dummies). Although these measures are 
validated as much as possible, they remain crude measures. In addition, the poor 
Cronbach’s alpha and the non-random sampling may have affected results. Additional 
research along these lines provides some fruitful areas for future research and may help to 
resolve some of the issues which are relevant in performance measurement literature.  
 
Despite the previous listed limitations, this research project sheds some light on issues 
which are relatively unexplored in previous literature. First of all, there appears to be a 
relation between task culture and the use of non-financial and, to a lesser extent, 
economic value performance measures. However, previous literature generally assumes 
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that culture (cultural controls) replaces rather than augments performance measurement 
(result controls; see Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003; Ouchi, 1979; an exception is 
Quinn & Cameron, 1999). There may be several reasons for this finding. First of all, a 
task culture is associated with decentralized decision making, flexible assignment of 
resources and short communication channels (for example, project teams). Internal 
integration and coordination of effort is moderate; task culture organizations may be 
integrated by common goals, but flexible, shifting structures may make coordination 
difficult (Harrison, 1972). Considering these flexible, shifting structures (and, associated 
with that, a high rotation of managers), non-financial performance measures may be used 
to communicate the goals of the organization (Malina & Selto, 2001) or to mitigate the 
short-term orientation of task culture organizations (Dutta & Reichelstein, 2003). Also, 
previous literature suggests that the use of performance measures should be matched to 
the delegation of decision rights (Abernethy, Bouwens & Van Lent, 2004; Nagar, 2002). 
As a result, it may be that task culture organizations are more decentralized and use a 
larger variety of performance measures to evaluate the decisions made by lower-level 
managers. Finally, it may be that task culture is a proxy for industry effects. Task culture 
is significantly related to two specific industries: financial services and non-financial 
services (=0.22 respectively =-0.23, p<0.10). Firms in the financial services industries 
may, to a larger extent than in other industries, use non-financial measures while firms in 
the non-financial services industry may use them to a lesser extent. An examination of 
the relation between organizational culture, the use of specific performance measures and 
the effects on performance appears to be a first fruitful area for future research.  
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A second avenue for further research is associated with the (lack of a) relation between 
strategic and other contextual factors, subjective performance measures and performance. 
One reason may be that it is hard to find an impact of specific factors as well as a 
performance effect at the same time (see Luft & Shields, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 2001)36. 
Another reason may be that the measures used in this survey (managerial intuition, 
competence management) are not considered useful measures by the firms in this sample. 
A third reason may be that the non-financial measures (for example, market share; R&D 
output; quality), which are used in case of a build strategy, appear to be able to reduce the 
riskiness of the manager to an acceptable level (Baker, 2002). Finally, managers may use 
objective performance measures in a subjective way or take the discretion to evaluate 
performance on factors other than the measures specified previously rather than that they 
use qualitative performance measures (Gibbs et al, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003). An 
investigation of the relation between strategy, the use of subjective measures and 
performance may provide interesting findings.  
 
 
                                                 
36
 The ‘misalignment hypothesis’ assumes that a significant percentage of firms have aligned their 
performance measurement system to the hypothesized variable, while at the same time a ‘misalignment’ 
results in lower performance. However, if all firms have (not) adapted to the equilibrium situation you can 
(cannot) find the impact of specific factors, yet you cannot (may) find the impact of misalignment.  
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6 Appendices 
Appendix A: Questionnaire (partially, original questions in Dutch) 
 
Characteristics of the organization 
 
A number of relevant data of your organizations is gathered in this part of the survey. Please 
indicate the most relevant alternative, or provide the requested information. If the provided 
alternatives do not provide an adequate description of the current situation within your 
organization, you can provide some alternatives. Please respond to all questions for your current 
function, i.e. for the organization (firm, division) for which you are responsible as a manager or 
that is your responsibility as a financial expert.  
 
 
1. Is your company listed on a stock exchange (SHAREHVL)?  
 
 (%) 
o Yes 49% 
o No 51% 
 
2. To what extent are the actions of the following actors in your external environment 
predictable (UNCERTTY)?  
(0 = irrelevant, 1 = never, 2 = hardly, 3 = sometimes, 4 = most of the time, 5 = always) 
 
 
mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
(a) Suppliers (e.g. price or quality changes, new materials) [R] 3.18 1.28 
(b) Competitors (e.g. price or quality changes, new products) [R] 3.21 1.05 
(c) Customers (e.g. demand for existing or new products) [R] 3.18 0.89 
(d) Financial/capital markets (e.g. changes in interest rates, availability of 
credit) [R] 3.02 1.06 
(e) Government regulatory agencies (e.g. changes in regulations on prices or 
product standards) [R] 3.05 0.99 
(f) Labor unions (e.g. changes in wages, working conditions) [R] 3.07 1.17 
   
Total summarized score 20.26 2.37 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.55  
[R]: item is reverse scored in order to make sure that a high score on this measure represents a 
high uncertainty score. 
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3. How would you characterize the corporate strategy of your organization? 
 
 (%) 
o Single business firm (SINGLBUS, dummy) 26% 
o Related diversified firm 66% 
o Unrelated diversified 8% 
 
4. How would you characterize the strategic mission of your organization (BUILDSTR)? (Please 
indicate below what percentage of your sales is accounted for by each of the four 
alternatives. Your answers should total 100%) 
 
 
Mean 
(%) 
Std. 
Dev 
(a) Build strategy: an increase in market share is more important than short-
term profits and short-term cash flows of your organization 
39.5 26.4 
(b) Hold strategy: protection of market share and competitive position is most 
important to your organization 
40.0 22.8 
(c) Harvest strategy: maximizing profitability and short-term cash flows is 
more important than market share to your organization  
15.5 17.8 
(d) Divest strategy: your organization is preparing for sale or liquidation 5.1 9.0 
 100%  
 
5. What was the size of your organization at the end of the previous year? 
 
 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
(a) Number of employees (in full time equivalents, fte; SIZE = log fte) 5,001 10,765 
(b) Sales (Mln Euros) 1,637 4,475 
(c) Total assets (mln euros) 12,900 58,320 
 
 
6. What is the focus of the culture of your organization? 
 
 (%) 
o Centralizing power, use of power in positions (power culture) 8.5% 
o Formal roles: emphasis on procedures, rules and regulations (role culture) 18.6% 
o Task requirements determine the way work is organized (task culture) 
TASKCULT, dummy) 72.9% 
o Other (please specify) …….  
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7. How satisfied are you with the performance of your organization on the following aspects? 
(0 = irrelevant, 1 = extremely dissatisfied, 2 = dissatisfied, 3 = neutral, 
 4 = satisfied, 5 = extremely satisfied) 
 
 mean Std. Dev. 
(a) Sales growth 3.30 1.28 
(b) Cost control, cost reduction 3.23 .99 
(c ) Profit, profit margin 3.30 1.26 
(d) Return on investment 3.23 1.03 
(e) Shareholder value, share price, dividends 1.81 1.54 
(f) Operational cash flows 3.19 1.17 
(g) Market orientation, customer orientation 3.45 .98 
(h) Innovation, R&D 3.15 .93 
(i) Quality of the organization, products and services 3.44 .65 
(k) Personnel development, human capital 3.13 .81 
   
Total summarized score 31.24 5.89 
   
Cronbach’s alpha 0.73  
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Appendix B: Analysis results 
 
B.1 Results Factor Analysis 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component    
  NONFIN 
 
EVMPMS SUBJPMS ACCTGPMS 
     
Process measures 0.855 0.006 0.059 -0.034 
Employee measures 0.840 -0.033 -0.167 0.169 
Customer measures 0.837 0.118 0.103 0.160 
Quality measures 0.827 0.217 0.221 0.087 
Innovation measures 0.775 0.141 0.222 0.100 
     
Shareholder value added (SVA) 0.118 0.838 0.091 0.171 
Economic value added (EVA©) 0.241 0.804 -0.111 0.071 
     
Intuition higher management -0.003 -0.017 0.921 0.107 
Competence management 0.367 0.044 0.786 -0.163 
     
Return on total capital (ROTC) -0.130 0.276 0.058 0.719 
Return on capital employed 
(ROCE) 
0.118 0.351 0.138 0.616 
Comparison of budget to reality 0.307 -0.129 -0.127 0.577 
Return on equity (ROE) 0.301 -0.382 -0.234 0.485 
     
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.91 0.73 0.76 0.46 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.    
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
NONFIN = non-financial measures; 
EVMPMS = economic value measures; 
SUBJPMS = subjective measures; 
ACCTGPMS = accounting performance measures. 
 
 
Table B.1: Results confirmatory factor analysis 
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TABLE 1: Hypothesized results 
 
      
Performance measure      
 
 
 
 
Accounting-
based 
performance 
measures 
 Economic 
value 
performance 
measures 
Non-
financial 
performance 
measures 
Subjective 
performance 
measures 
Determinant      
Importance of shareholder 
value (H1) 
0  + 0 0 
Single business strategy 
(H2) 
0  - + + 
Build strategic mission 
(H3) 
0  0 + + 
Task culture (H4) 0  + + - 
Uncertainty (H5) 0  0 + + 
Size (H6) 0  + + - 
Manufacturing industry 
(H7) 
0  + 0 - 
      
Performance (H8) 0  +/- a) +/- a) +/- a) 
      
a): performance is high if the organization is matched to the previous pattern. otherwise 
performance will be low. 
 
 
C:\data\word\strategypms\Strategyandpmsv3.doc   64 
TABLE 2: Profile of Responding Companies 
Number of Employees 
(fte)
0-100 100-500 500-
1000 
1.000-
10.000 
10.000 
or more 
Total  
in 
sample 
Distribu
tion 
Sample 
(%) 
CBS 
2001 
(%) a) 
Industry         
         
Agriculture. hunting & 
forestry 
 2    2 3 1 
Fishing     1 1 2 0 
Mining & quarrying      0 0 0 
Manufacturing  7 5 6 2 19 33 34 
Electricity. gas & water 
supply 
     0 0 1 
Construction 1   1  2 3 10 
Trade 1  2 4 3 10 17 19 
Hotels & Restaurants    1  1 2 2 
Transport. storage & 
communications 
   4  4 7 8 
Financial intermediation 2 6  1 2 11 19 3 
Real estate. renting and 
business activities  
  4 2  6 10 21 
Non-profit. other 1     1 2 NR 
 
        
Total  5 15 11 19 8 58 100% 100% 
 
        
 
a) The table provides the distribution amongst several industries. The target sample does not 
include non-profit companies; however. the shares of some companies are held by government 
organizations. The actual response is compared to the distribution of large Dutch organizations 
(>100 full time equivalents) provided by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) over 2001. 
excluding public sector organizations.  
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
      
Independent variables:      
SHAREHVL 61 0 1 .49 .50 
SINGLEBUS 61 0 1 .26 .44 
BUILDSTR 59 -140.00 100.00 13.83 45.63 
TASKCULT 61 0 1 .70 .46 
UNCTTY 61 7.00 27.00 11.29 3.59 
SIZE 58 2.08 10.92 6.90 1.89 
PRIMMFTG 61 0 1 .43 .50 
      
Dependent variables:      
ACCTGPM 56 5.00 20.00 12.29 3.50 
VBMPMS 55 .00 10.00 4.05 2.77 
NFINPMS 54 5.00 25.00 16.50 5.79 
SUBJPMS 56 .00 10.00 4.34 2.51 
      
      
PERFRMNC 58 16.00 46.00 31.24 5.89 
SALESGR99-01 a)  33 -11.08 474.48 51.68 95.03 
SALESGR00-01 a) 33 -12.78 219.88 14.56 39.74 
ROCE99-01 a) 32 -.07 76.01 19.19 14.19 
ROCE2001 a) 32 -3.01 118.64 18.73 22.45 
      
a): in %; distribution is skewed to the right. 
 
SHAREHVL = Importance of shareholder value (i.e., 1=firm is listed on stock exchange, 
0=firm is not listed on stock exchange); 
SINGLEBUS =  Corporate strategy (single business firm = 1, rest =0); 
BUILDSTR = Strategic mission; 
TASKCULT
 
= Task culture dummy variable (i.e., 1=task culture; 0=other culture); 
UNCRTTY
 
= Uncertainty; 
SIZE = Size (log of the number of fte’s);  
PRIMMFTG = Industry dummy (i.e., 1=primary and manufacturing industry, 0=other 
industries);  
ACCTGPMS =  accounting performance measures;  
EVMPMS = economic value measures; 
NONFIN = non-financial measures;  
SUBJPMS =  subjective measures; 
PERFRMNC =  performance (perceptual measure); 
SALESGR99-01= sales growth 1999-2001; 
SALESGR00-01= sales growth 2000-2001; 
ROCE99-01= return on capital employed (average 1999-2001); 
ROCE2001= return on capital employed over 2001. 
 
TABLE 4: Pearson Correlations between Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. SINGLEBUS 
         
 
2. GROWTHSTR .153          
 
         
 
3. TASKCULT .141 -.054         
 
         
 
4. UNCERTTY -.049 -.015 -.118        
 
         
 
5. SIZE -.006 .033 .025 -.278*       
 
         
 
6. PRIMMFTG -.062 .105 .049 -.295* -.014      
 
         
 
7. SHAREHVL -.139 .037 -.083 -.137 .176 .213     
 
         
 
8. ACCTGPMS -.050 .125 .054 -.065 -.037 .203 .183    
 
         
 
9. EVMPMS .062 .130 .099 -.190 .263 .227 .311* .265   
 
         
 
10. NFINPMS -.061 .290* .191 -.172 .371** .039 .239 .340* .274*  
 
         
 
11. SUBJPMS .047 -.017 .043 -.034 -.025 .076 .089 .055 .098 .307* 
 
         
 
*.**  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level respectively 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
 
SHAREHVL = Importance of shareholder value (i.e., 1=firm is listed on stock exchange, 0=firm is 
not listed on stock exchange); 
SINGLEBUS =  Corporate strategy (single business firm = 1, rest =0); 
BUILDSTR = Strategic mission; 
TASKCULT
 
= Task culture dummy variable (i.e., 1=task culture; 0=other culture); 
UNCRTTY = Uncertainty; 
SIZE = Size (log of the number of fte’s);  
PRIMMFTG = Industry dummy (i.e., 1=primary and manufacturing industry, 0=other industries);  
ACCTGPMS =  accounting performance measures;  
EVMPMS = economic value measures; 
NONFIN = non-financial measures;  
SUBJPMS =  subjective measures; 
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TABLE 5: Diffusion of performance measures 
 
A performance measure is defined as the indicator or criterion that is used to measure the 
performance of managers, employees and departments within your organization. The performance 
measurement system is defined as the whole sum of performance measures that are used in your 
organization. The questions refer to the current situation in your organization.  
 
Please indicate to what extent your organization uses the following performance measures  
(0 = measure unknown, 1 =never,  2 = hardly, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) 
 
 
Mean Standard deviation 
% using 
measure 
often or 
always 
(a) No explicit performance measure 1.31 1.23 NR 
Budgets:    
(b) Comparison of budget to actual results  4.73 .59 92.9% 
Rates-of-return / return on investment (ROI):     
(c) return on equity (ROE)     2.96 1.49 39.2% 
(d) return on capital employed (ROCE)    2.77 1.88 41.0% 
(e) return on total capital (ROTC) 1.82 1.40 14.3% 
  - other rate-of-return: …        
Risk adjusted rates-of-return:       
(f) risk adjusted return on capital (RAROC)   1.07 .99 5.4% 
(g) return on risk adjusted capital (RORAC)   1.05 .98 5.4% 
  - other risk adjusted rate-of-return. nl: …      
Value based management measures:     
(h) economic value added (EVA©)    2.21 1.68 28.6% 
(i) cash flow return on investment (CFROI)   2.38 1.65 30.4% 
(j) shareholder value added (SVA)    1.89 1.46 16.4% 
  - other value based management measure: …     
Nonfinancial measures:        
(k) Process measures (eg time to market, # of process 
improvements) 
3.38 1.56 56.4% 
(l) Customer measures (eg customer satisfaction, customer 
loyalty) 
3.45 1.32 57.1% 
(m) Employee measures (eg employee satisfaction, sickness rates) 3.45 1.32 51.8% 
(n) Innovation measures (eg: education budget, number of 
innovations) 
2.71 1.21 27.3% 
(o) Quality measures (eg. Quality scores, number of defects)  3.36 1.42 55.4% 
(p) Risk measures (eg. Operational risk, credit risk) 2.95 1.38 41.8 
  - other non-financial measures: …     
Subjective measures:         
(q) Competence management     2.23 1.37 19.7% 
(r) Intuition higher management  2.11 1.42 17.8% 
  - other subjective measures: …    
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TABLE 6: The Impact of Contextual Factors on the Use of Corporate Performance Measurement Systems (Absolute) 
 
Dependent: ACCTG 
PMS 
  EVM 
PMS 
  NONFIN 
PMS 
  SUBJ 
PMS 
  
 Predictd 
sign 
Stand.  t Predictd 
sign 
Stand.  t Predictd 
sign 
Stand.  t Predictd 
sign 
Stand.  t 
             
             
(Constant) a)  - -1.214  -*** -2.852  -** -2.298   -1.047 
SHAREHVL  .181 1.210  .326** 2.447  .226* 1.795  .110 .710 
SINGLEBUS  -.056 -.370  .131 .976  -.145 -1.132  .127 .816 
BUILDSTR  .156 1.047  .108 .812  .353*** 2.787  -.038 -.246 
TASKCULT  .134 .911  .212# 1.613  .323** 2.615  .061 .404 
UNCERTTY  .035 .233  .070 .509  .149 1.129  .002 .015 
SIZE  -.060 -.403  .253* 1.906  .298** 2.339  -.020 -.130 
PRIMMFTG  .116 .758  .185 1.356  -.029 -.224  .106 .672 
             
             
             
R2  0.10   0.29   0.38   0.04  
Adj R2  -0.05   0.18   0.28   -0.11  
F-value  0.66   2.55   3.77   0.26  
Significance  0.71   0.03   0.01   0.97  
N  51   50   49   51  
             
a)
 The sign for the constant is presented. including the significance level. 
#,*, **, ***  Significant at the 0.15, 0.10, 0.05 respectively 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
SHAREHVL = Importance of shareholder value (i.e., 1=firm is listed on stock exchange, 0=firm is not listed on stock exchange); SINGLEBUS = Corporate 
strategy (single business firm = 1, rest =0); BUILDSTR = Strategic build mission; TASKCULT
 
= Task culture dummy variable (i.e., 1=task culture; 0=other 
culture); UNCRTTY = Uncertainty; SIZE = Size (log of the number of fte’s); PRIMMFTG = Industry dummy (i.e., 1=primary and manufacturing industry, 
0=other industries); ACCTGPMS = accounting performance measures; EVMPMS = economic value measures; NONFIN = non-financial measures; SUBJPMS 
= subjective measures. 
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TABLE 7: Spearman Correlation between Sum of Square Root from Squared Standardized Residuals and Performance 
 
Spearman correlation       
  PERFRMNC SALESGR 
1999-2001 
SALESGR 
2000-2001 
ROCE 
1999-2001 
ROCE 
2001 
       
RES(EVMPMS) Correlation .055 .128 -.190 .004 .291 
 Significance .701 .501 .316 .983 .126# 
 N 51 30 30 29 29 
       
       
RES(NFINPMS) Correlation .022 .099 -.156 -.291 -.213 
 Significance .881 .618 .427 .134# .277 
 N 47 28 28 28 28 
       
#. *. **  Correlation is significant at the 0.15. 0.10 level and 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
PERFRMNC =  performance (perceptual measure); 
SALESGR99-01= sales growth 1999-2001; 
SALESGR00-01= sales growth 2000-2001; 
ROCE99-01= return on capital employed (average 1999-2001); 
ROCE2001= return on capital employed over 2001. 
RES(EVMPMS) =  sum of squared residuals for regressions of importance of shareholder value goal and size on use of economic value measures 
(EVMPMS); 
RES(NFINPMS) = sum of squared residuals for regressions of importance of shareholder value goal, strategic build mission, task culture and size on use of 
non financial performance measures (NONFINPMS); 
 
 
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Finance and Accounting” 
 
2005 
 
Royal Ahold:  A Failure Of Corporate Governance 
Abe De Jong, Douglas V. Dejong, Gerard Mertens en Peter Roosenboom 
ERS-2005-002-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1863 
 
Capital Structure Policies in Europe: Survey Evidence 
Dirk Brounen, Abe de Jong and Kees Koedijk 
ERS-2005-005-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1923 
 
A Comparison of Single Factor Markov-Functional and Multi Factor Market Models  
Raoul Pietersz, Antoon A. J. Pelsser 
ERS-2005-008-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1930 
 
Efficient Rank Reduction of Correlation Matrices 
Igor Grubišić and Raoul Pietersz 
ERS-2005-009-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1933 
 
Generic Market Models  
Raoul Pietersz and Marcel van Regenmortel 
ERS-2005-010-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1907 
 
The price of power: valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in french ipo firms 
Peter Roosenboom and Willem Schramade 
ERS-2005-011-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1921 
 
The Success of Stock Selection Strategies in Emerging Markets: Is it Risk or Behavioral Bias? 
Jaap van der Hart, Gerben de Zwart and Dick van Dijk 
ERS-2005-012-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1922 
 
Sustainable Rangeland Management Using a Multi-Fuzzy Model: How to Deal with Heterogeneous Experts’ Knowledge 
Hossein Azadi, Mansour Shahvali, Jan van den Berg and Nezamodin Faghih 
ERS-2005-016-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1934 
 
A Test for Mean-Variance Efficiency of a given Portfolio under Restrictions 
Thierry Post 
ERS-2005-032-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6729 
 
Testing for Stochastic Dominance Efficiency 
Oliver Linton, Thierry Post and Yoon-Jae Whang 
ERS-2005-033-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6726 
 
 
 
 
Wanted: A Test for FSD Optimality of a Given Portfolio 
Thierry Post 
ERS-2005-034-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6727 
 
How Domestic is the Fama and French Three-Factor Model? An Application to the Euro Area 
Gerard A. Moerman 
ERS-2005-035-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6626 
 
Bond underwriting fees and keiretsu affiliation in Japan 
Abe de Jong, Peter Roosenboom and Willem Schramade 
ERS-2005-038-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6725 
 
Sourcing of Internal Auditing: An Empirical Study 
Roland F. Speklé, Hilco J. van Elten and Anne-Marie Kruis 
ERS-2005-046-F&A 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6891 
 
The Nature of Power Spikes: a regime-switch approach 
Cyriel de Jong 
ERS-2005-052-F&A 
 
‘New’ Performance Measures: Determinants of Their Use and Their Impact on Performance 
Frank H.M. Verbeeten 
ERS-2005-054-F&A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing 
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship 
